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The notion of a “post-racial era” not only assumes that the meaning of race has withered in the
United States, it also rests on the false assumption that race is something objective and fixed.
Speaking from the perspective of a sociologist, I can offer you tons of data that show continuing
social and economic inequality in the United States due to race. For example, although it is true
that specifically racial language has been removed from most U.S. laws, one can still
demonstrate the racialized application of laws. And while it is true that the proportion of blacks
in the middle class has increased, it is easy to show that black incomes are no match for white
wealth, and that middle-class blacks are more economically vulnerable than middle-class whites.
Indeed, more data can be brought forth to show the continuing harm caused by racialized
thinking than can be assembled to show its demise.
While attitudes about racial differences have shown positive shifts over the past 30 years,
measured by a significant decline in the proportion of Americans who believe that there are
inherent differences between blacks and whites, the proportion of Americans who are racist has
not declined. This is because of the subjectivity and fluidity of the concept of race. If the targets
of racism have increased, then racism has increased. If the pool of negatively racialized groups
has expanded, then racism has expanded. Here I point to the racialization of Arab Americans, a
group once treated as marginal white but now facing high levels of prejudice and discrimination,
both individual and structural. Driven by people who believe that personal traits can be tied to
physical features and modes of dress, and that all who share certain visibilities also share certain
personal traits, these attitudes and actions represent what we call race and racism.
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The history of Arab Americans is complex and varied, and a number of scholars have
demonstrated that Arab Americans faced discrimination during their formative years in the U.S.
[roughly 1900-1930]. Yet by my way of accounting, as a group, they had greater levels of
freedom of movement, residential choice, access to education, participation in government and
financial success than contemporaneous African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans and
Native Americans. Similar to “white ethnics” — Southern and Eastern Europeans and Jews —
their access to resources for social mobility was much higher than people of color, while at the
same time, they faced exclusions and barriers imposed by established whites.
The most significant barriers Arabs faced in this era was challenges to their right to naturalize as
U.S. citizens, and later, access to immigrant visas — both rights restricted to people “commonly
understood” to be white. Naturalization decisions at the time were made on a case-by-case basis
by local court clerks, who used their own sense of who was white to decide eligibility because
the federal government had not clarified matters of race. Decisions to deny naturalization to Arab
immigrants occurred in some cases and in some places, and not in others. When made, they were

justified by the idea that the geographic origins of Arabs meant that they were not “white” as
commonly understood or intended by U.S. law, even if they were considered Caucasian. Judges
ruled in varying ways between 1909 and 1913 in court challenges to these decisions. The most
important case for Arab Americans at the time was a federal appellate court case in which the
judge ruled that George Dow, a “Syrian” was eligible for naturalization because “generally
received opinion” supported the idea that people from the part of Asia that included Syria were
white persons.” [Dow v US, 1915]
These challenges to Arab rights to naturalize occurred during a time of anti-immigrant hysteria in
the U.S., characterized by calls for barring Asians from migrating, resulting in the 1917
Immigration Act, also known as the Asiatic Barred Zone Act. Claims — broadly accepted by
established whites — of the racial inferiority of Southern and Eastern Europeans led to the
imposition of quotas limiting the immigration of them as well as Arabs (called Syrians then).
When we set the naturalization challenges faced by Arabs in their larger context, it is clear that
these actions were part of a national effort to solidify white privilege and exclusivity at a time
when who was white was defined more narrowly than it is now.
Interestingly, in 1941, the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decided in favor of Majid
Ramsay Sharif, an Arab who had been denied an immigrant visa on the basis that he was not
white, using government testimony submitted in a 1923 Supreme Court case concerning the
denial of naturalization to an Asian man [US v Thind]. The BIA declared that Arabs were white
because “so much of the Near East has contributed to, and was assimiliable with, the
development of Western Civilization of Greece and Rome” and “that it was not intended, either
in 1790 … or certainly in 1940 … that Arabians be excluded from the group of ‘white persons’.”
Thus, as Immigration and Naturalization Service historian Marian Smith (2003) pointed out,
based on historical and civilizational arguments, the BIA argued that “whiteness” was associated
with Western civilization, and that Western civilization included the Arab world. It is interesting
to consider whether ruling differently might have contested Jesus’ customary portrayal in white
American culture as a white man. A similar point was made in a letter to the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor in 1909 from the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, complaining
about the denial of naturalization to Turks, Syrians, Armenians, Palestinians and Jews. It argued
that if these decisions were upheld, “David and Isaih [sic] and even Jesus of Nazareth himself”
would be prevented from becoming U.S. citizens.

Constructing the Arab Other
This very idea — that the Arab World and the West share a common civilization and history —
is no longer commonly held in American culture (although it is factually correct). Indeed, quite
the opposite is true and this outcome is due to concerted, politically motivated efforts to define
Arabs as a people who are inherently different from and inferior to white Americans. While most
of the white ethnics who had earlier experienced discrimination and limiting immigration quotas
were eventually absorbed into “whiteness,” Arab Americans were symbolically moved in the
opposite direction by racialized portrayals aimed at defining the way Americans saw them. These
social constructions of Arabs and the Arab World became dominant in American culture
beginning in the late 1960s. They were tied to the foreign policy objectives of a rising U.S.
global power and to efforts to build broad American popular support for the actions of the State

of Israel, accomplished by likening Israelis to Americans and Arabs to a lesser civilization. Thus,
the 1967 Israeli occupation of the rest of Palestine, as well as parts of Egypt and Lebanon, was
hailed in the American media as a victory of the civilized over the barbaric, of “us” over “them.”
Coupled with media coverage of the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics,
the 1973 Arab oil embargo, Abscam and a continuing flow of anti-Arab films and talk shows, the
U.S. social climate became so hostile to Arabs that Arab Americans founded several major
organizations during this time to combat the growing racism. In 1977, prominent sociologist
Seymour Martin Lipset declared that public opinion polls showed that American attitudes toward
Arabs were “close to racist.” The renowned Palestinian-American scholar Edward Said was
driven in part to write his 1978 masterpiece Orientalism by wanting an explanation for how it
was that depictions of Arabs he saw in the U.S. bore no relationship to the Arab World he knew.
In sum, if whiteness is determined not only by phenotype (skin color, facial structure, hair type)
but also by notions of a shared culture, history and values, then Arabs became unambiguously
non-white when the narrative was rewritten to sever historical ties between white America and
“them.”
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By the 1980s, Arab Americans had clearly been transformed into a cultural “other.” In addition
to being represented negatively in films and on American television, talk shows and news
programs, they were described in dehumanizing ways in classrooms and textbooks, in
encyclopedias and thesauruses, and were degraded in other venues of culture such as Halloween
costumes and video games. To provide a flavor of the time, I quote from an essay published in
the popular science Omni magazine entitled “The Importance of Hugging” by Howard Bloom
(1989). In it, Bloom offered a cultural explanation for “Arab brutality” (or is it Muslim?) and
called Arabs a “walking time bomb.”
Could the denial of warmth lie behind Arab brutality? Could these keepers of Islamic flame be
suffering from a lack of hugging? … In much of Arab society the cold and even brutal approach
to children has still not stopped. Public warmth between men and women is considered a sin.
And the Arab adult, stripped of intimacy and thrust into a life of cold isolation, has become a
walking time bomb. An entire people may have turned barbaric for the simple lack of a hug.
All of these efforts were intended to convey a simple message: Arabs were a people who held
different values from everyone else, but most significantly, from “us.” They were from a
barbaric, backward civilization that shared no history with the civilized West: They did not
respect human life, women or even children. And most importantly, they were all the same,
whether rich, poor, Christian, Muslim, educated, illiterate, Palestinian, Egyptian, Iraqi, Saudi,
male, female, young or old. (See Jack Shaheen’s body of work for detailed media analysis.)
A wide body of literature demonstrates the increasing social and political exclusion of Arab
Americans that flowed from these depictions, as well as from the actions of persons who wanted
their voices of protest to be silenced. Candidates for political office frequently returned ArabAmerican campaign contributions on the premise that they tainted their candidacy. Federal
government agencies, sometimes with local police cooperation, spied on Arab-American
activists and student organizers were often labeled as (and sometime charged with being)

supporters of terrorism. Except for some progressive left circles, Arab Americans were usually
not invited to “sit at the table” of coalitions of activists and policymakers because their presence
was thought to “poison” a group’s credibility. Arab-American women scholars were shouted
down by feminists at scholarly meetings, unable to present their papers while being accused of
supporting misogyny. For my part, as a budding scholar of Arab Americans, some faculty told
me that I was studying terrorists while my mentor, Professor Janet Abu-Lughod, told me that I
would never be able to get a university job. All of these actions rendered Arab-American
activists, scholars, history and experiences “invisible.” When you are invisible, no one cares
about what is happening to you. This principle applied equally to Arab Americans and to Arabs
overseas, and that was the point.
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This institutional exclusion had its parallel in social relations, as Arab Americans experienced
many forms of institutional and individual prejudice, discrimination, harassment and periodic
hate crimes. It was said during these times that Arabs were the only group that could be
portrayed as barbaric, caricatured as animals, publicly slandered in the mainstream media and
ridiculed at work and school without negative reprisal. Since Arabs were not officially a minority
group, they had limited access to the primary civil rights institutional venues for reporting
incidents, launching complaints, demanding redress and collective protest. They were
uncountable and silenced in yet another way. The same was true for Muslims; after the 1979
Iranian revolution, they were increasingly characterized by the very same stereotypes and often
conflated with Arabs, a pattern that intensified in the 1990s. Bloom’s quote above is only one of
many such examples of conflation. Here again we see the relationship between stereotypes and
political interests/foreign policy: As challenges to Western hegemony in the Arab World and
beyond came increasingly from Islamist activists and decreasingly from nationalists, the
stereotypes were nearly seamlessly shifted from one collectivity to the other, or applied to both at
the same time. Muslims were also portrayed as a group that potentially threatened the American
culture itself, in particular its core values of democracy and personal liberty, a characterization
that went beyond those of Arabs. Despite organized protests and attempts to counter these
representations, both Arab Americans and Muslim Americans lacked the power to have much
impact. After all, being negatively racialized and being powerless are highly correlated. (For an
explanation of why Arab Americans and Muslim Americans show relatively high levels of
education and income despite this racialization, see my article “The Social Construction of
Difference and the Arab American Experience.”)

The Post 9/11 period
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Immediately on September 11, 2001, all of this prior stigmatization and disempowerment
crystallized into a multi-pronged attack on Arab and Muslim Americans, as they were
collectively held responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon by agencies
of the U.S. government and much of the American public. After all, pre-existing social
constructions had configured them as people who would readily conduct and/or approve of this
type of attack. Absent this framework for interpreting 9/11, it is unlikely that the millions in

these communities would have been held accountable for the actions of 19 people they had never
met. We did not witness this type of public and government reaction to other recent mass
murders in the U.S., such as the Oklahoma City bombings, or the Columbine, Virginia Tech,
Sandy Hook, Aurora, and Oak Creek Sikh Temple shootings, or Fort Hood 1 and 2, or the
Boston Marathon bombing, although even in these cases, when a Muslim was involved, the
narrative was different. Surely the massive number of people killed on 9/11, the destruction of
major American symbols and the fact that the perpetrators were not from the U.S. are very
significant to the higher level of reaction, but the type of reaction, the collective blaming, was a
specific outcome of framing of Arabs and Muslims as a monolithic group that was inherently
violent.
With this point, I announce my dissent from a trend I find among many scholars these days,
which is to mark 9/11 as some kind of starting point for anti-Arab racism and Islamophobia. Not
only is this not the case, as the literature amply demonstrates, when we examine what this
assumption means, I think many will agree that the error is significant. First of all, we must
understand that racism causes all members of a group to be held responsible for something. The
“something” does not happen first. What happens first is an understanding that all people of a
certain category can be viewed as the same, that there are no variations in values, beliefs or
points of view. The bombing of Pearl Harbor and subsequent internment of Japanese Americans
in camps did not cause anti-Japanese racism, rather racism against Japanese Americans provided
support for the idea that all Japanese people posed a threat to the U.S. and allowed the
internments to take place with government and popular support.
This sequencing, that anti-Arab racism and Islamophobia preceded the collective attacks on
Arabs and Muslims after 9/11 is important to recognize and is one of the major points of my
book Homeland Insecurity: The Arab American and Muslim American Experience after 9/11,
which is based on sociological research I conducted after 9/11. When people assert that it all
changed for Arab and Muslim Americans after 9/11, this means that it was the event itself that
caused this change. It means that the attack by 19 people who happened to be Arabs and
Muslims caused the collective reprisals against millions of Arab and Muslim Americans. This
simply is not and cannot be the case because that is not how social life works. If it did work like
this, then all whites would be vulnerable to attack after each violent mass killing by a white
male. Social research has consistently shown that human reactions to events (and to people) are
based on the meaning associated with the event, the framework in which it is understood. In the
U.S., white crime is portrayed as an individual act, not a reflection of what any other white
person would do. Individual responsibility is a positive trait associated with whiteness, a fact not
unrelated to whites being the dominant group in the U.S. Similarly, the meaning of 9/11 was, for
so many Americans, established long before the event ever happened.
There is no doubt that it all got worse for Arab Americans and Muslim Americans in the years
that followed the 9/11 attacks. This historical period cannot be summarized; the assaults on
freedom of movement, personal safety and human dignity were so many and came from so many
places. Readers can consult my writings as well as those of other scholars about this period
because it has been amply documented. What we can say is that today, 13 years after these
events, there is clearly greater unanimity among Arab Americans that they have been racialized.
Mobilizations of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans and their allies are opening places at

the table that have been long denied. This agency has many forms, from advocacy for a Census
category (right now Arabs are counted as whites and cannot be easily distinguished in local and
national statistics) to waging unapologetic campaigns for Palestine, and everything in between.
These struggles cleverly balance themes of similarity and difference that look nothing like the
ones that were used to racialize them. Arab Americans and Muslim Americans and their allies
were doing all of these things prior to 9/11, yet they could be easily ignored or discredited. Right
now, despite the concerted efforts of what has become primarily an anti-Muslim movement
(which drags Arabs into it by association), led by a core group of activists with easy access to
certain media outlets, it seems to me that more people are listening. The massive and unjust
reactions to the 9/11 attacks brought Arab and Muslim Americans out of invisibility, and efforts
to silence them, while ongoing, are less effective than they used to be.
In the U.S., race is not simply a black-white dichotomy; race is a lived reality, a position on a
continuum that correlates with how one is socially perceived, how one experiences government,
dominant social institutions, freedom of speech and movement, personal safety and human
dignity. Although still technically “white,” Arab-American history reveals a racialization tied to
the rise of the U.S. as a global power that has produced social experiences similar to other people
of color. Not post-racial, this is new racial.

